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Seeing like the International Community:  How 
Peacebuilding Failed (and Survived) in Tajikistan 
John Heathershaw
The international community claims transformative power over post-conflict spaces  
via the concept of peacebuilding.  International actors discursively make space for  
themselves in settings such as the Central Asian state of Tajikistan which endured a 
civil war during the 1990s and has only seen an end to widespread political violence in 
recent years.  With the work of James C. Scott, this paper challenges the notion that 
post-conflict spaces are merely the objects of international intervention.  It reveals  
how, even in  cases  of apparent  stability  such as  that  of Tajikistan,  international 
actors  fail  to  achieve  their  ostensible  goals  for  that  place  yet  make  space  for  
themselves  in  that  place.   International  peacebuilders  may  provide  essential 
resources  for  the  re-emergence  of  local  forms  of  order  yet  these  symbolic  and 
material resources are inevitably re-interpreted and re-appropriated by local actors  
to serve purposes which may be the opposite of their aims.  However, despite this 
‘failure’ of peacebuilding it nevertheless survives as a discursive construction through 
highly  subjective  processes  of  monitoring  and  evaluation.   So  maintained, 
peacebuilding  is  a  constitutive  element  of  world  order  where  the  necessity  of  
intervention for humanitarian, democratic and statebuilding ends goes unchallenged. 
This  raises  the  question  of  what  or  where  –  in  spatial  terms  –  is  the  locus  of  
international intervention: the local recipients of peacebuilding programmes (who 
are the ostensible targets) or ‘the International Community’ itself (whose space is re-
inscribed as that of an imperfect but necessary regulator of world order).  .  
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Introduction1
It is now widely accepted that many of the peacebuilding policies and practices of 
1990s were over-ambitious, ineffective and at times counter-productive (Lund 2003; 
Paris 2004; MacGinty 2006).  Moreover, this failure was a product of a very subjective 
process of policy design where post-conflict spaces were to be changed in the image of 
the interveners.  The actors of the ‘international community’2 envisioned or ‘saw’ 
post-conflict spaces according to how they saw themselves: as liberal or Wilsonian 
(Paris 1997, 2001).  This ‘mission civilisatrice’, it is argued, often brought a return to 
conflict and dysfunctional politics (Paris 2002).  Critics have shown that the praxis of 
peacebuilding is  weak and inconsistent (Paris  2004), with a consolidation of peace 
occurring in only a minority of cases of international assistance (Doyle & Sambanis 
2006).  Thus, it is often noted that peacebuilding leads at best to a return of basic 
security and ‘negative’ peace whilst conflict transformation towards ‘positive’ peace 
remains  elusive (Lund 2003; Junne and Verkoren 2005).  More radical  critics  raise 
questions  about  the  ‘low  standards’  of  peacebuilders  who  apparently  accept 
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pragmatically this ‘negative’ peace and label it a (relative) success (MacGinty 2006). 
Meanwhile reformers advocate a policy shift towards statebuilding in the International 
Community  (Paris  2004;  Doyle  &  Sambanis  2006),  a  move  which  implies  an 
endorsement of Paris’ thesis that the liberalism which works for us doesn’t necessarily 
work for them (Paris 2006).  However, reality may not be so easy to discern and agents 
may not be so in control of the process as prevailing opinions suggest.  By contrast it 
may be that peacebuilding ‘fails’ to meet its transformative objectives and ‘survives’ 
in an enhanced statebuilding discourse not because of reality but despite it.  In other 
words, the shift from peacebuilding to statebuilding in post-conflict spaces is based 
not on the discovery of objective reality of the post-conflict territories but on inter-
subjective, inter-textual relations of space-making. 
This paper considers this puzzle in the particular context of Tajikistan.  By the 
standards  of  negative  peace  Tajikistan  can  and is  claimed as  a  success  (Doyle  & 
Sambanis 2006: 332, fn 6), but by the standards of positive peace it  is  an abject 
failure.  This problematique highlights the need to investigate two concomitant areas 
of study.  The first regards the nature of international intervention and why it failed to 
achieve its objectives of liberal reform and democratization; the second concerning 
the nature of the peace itself  and why it  has held.  In short we have two broad 
research questions of the Tajik peace:
1. How and why has peacebuilding failed in Tajikistan?
2. How and why has negative peace held in Tajikistan?
These questions are deeply interconnected and hard to separate.  However, they are 
also complex and difficult to handle within the context of a single paper.  Thus, this 
paper takes the former of these two questions and provides an answer to that question 
which  is  illustrated  from  a  specific  area  of  peacebuilding  in  Tajikistan:  the 
international NGO community’s peacebuilding and decentralization initiatives in Tajik 
communities.   Many  of  these  programmes,  including  the  ones  I  studied  during 
fieldwork,  failed  in  terms  of  the  ambitious  goals  they set  themselves.   However, 
addressing the question of how peacebuilding failed raises a further and in many ways 
more fascinating question: despite this ‘failure’ (to reach specific goals in a given 
context), how does the approach ‘survive’ (as a credible strategy of peacebuilding in 
the eyes of international NGOs)?  The answer to this question tells us much about the 
spatial  complexity  of  post-conflict  settings  and  the  role  of  simulation  in  the 
maintenance of contemporary world order.
My argument is  elaborated with respect  to the work of James C. Scott,  in 
particular his 1998 study,  Seeing Like A State:  How Certain Schemes to Improve the 
Human Condition Have Failed.   Much like the high-modernist, often state-socialist, 
interventions which Scott profiles, peacebuilding takes the form of a rational design: a 
normative technique  to  do something to  an object,  an ‘other’,  in  order  to  elicit 
behavioural and ideational change in that object.  In the complexities of local context 
such a grand narrative inevitably meets local processes which determine its working 
out in practice.  Local actors take exceptions to its model, subvert its techniques, and 
reappropriate  its  resources  to  further  their  authority  and  livelihoods  in  context. 
Peacebuilding – to return to our question – fails as it is a ‘thin simplification’ of reality 
which is unable to achieve its goals in local spaces.   As Scott argues with respect to 
the case studies of state intervention which he studied, formal design depends on 
informal, contextual processes. 
In each case, the necessarily thin, schematic model of social organisation and 
production animating the planning was inadequate as a set of instructions for 
creating a successful social order.  By themselves the simplified rules can never 
generate a functioning community, city, or economy.  Formal order, to be more 
explicit, is always and to some considerable degree parasitic on informal 
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processes, which the formal scheme does not recognise, without which it could 
not exist, and which it alone cannot create or maintain (1998: 310, my 
emphasis). 
This dynamic of conflict yet interdependence between the formal and informal is not 
simply a question of social organization, but of space.  It highlights the disjuncture 
between the macro- and micro-levels of a given intervention.  I adapt Scott’s approach 
to questions of international peacebuilding to explore the nature of the interaction 
between local, elite and international spaces.  In the discursive relations between 
these  constituencies  I  find  the  inter-subjective  processes  by  which  knowledge  is 
produced in post-conflict international relations.
My field research in Tajikistan involved both discourse analysis of written and 
oral  data  and  ethnographic  participation  with  international  organizations  in 
communities, sometimes as a consultant-evaluator of peacebuilding programmes.  It 
constitutes an attempt to use the in-depth study of a single case to make propositions 
about the general phenomenon of international peacebuilding in order to stimulate 
debate and further research.  Thus, the processes of ‘failure’ and ‘survival’ which I 
chart  here  refer  to  the  tension  between  the  discourse  and  the  practices  of  the 
particular programmes which I studied.  However, the proposition I wish to make is 
that this dynamic may be, in some form, an inherent feature of peacebuilding.  The 
argument is developed in four parts.  Part one introduces the case of post-conflict 
Tajikistan and three discourses or communities of understanding and acting in that 
context: international, elite and popular.  This constitutes what Hansen (2006) calls a 
multiple ‘selves’ approach.  In the second part the paper focuses on the international 
‘self’ of  post-conflict  Tajikistan  looking  at  how the  International  Community  sees 
peacebuilding in Tajik localities.  The paper then goes on to briefly summarise the 
nature of failure; the triumph of local practices of adaptation and reappropriation 
over  international  models  and  processes.   Finally,  the  paper  discusses  how 
peacebuilding survives in the International Community through processes of monitoring 
and evaluation.  
Post-Conflict Tajikistan
In May 1992, shortly after the fall of the Soviet Union, Tajikistan entered a destructive 
civil war which cost upwards of 100,000 lives and left around 250,000 as refugees.  A 
peace agreement was not signed until June 1997 between the government, dominated by 
cadres from the region of Kulob (especially the President’s home town of Danghara), and 
the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) composed of a wide-ranging group of factions led by 
the Islamic Revival Party and representatives of the Rasht Valley region.  While the 1993-
1997 peace process culminated in a  de jure peace with the UTO, and the 1997-2000 
period brought a fragile de facto peace between the factions, it was the years after 2000 
when peace was consolidated.  The year 2000 brought the creation of the UN Tajikistan 
Office  of  Peacebuilding  (UNTOP)  to  replace  the  earlier  UN  Mission  of  Observers  to 
Tajikistan (UNMOT), in order ‘to consolidate peace and promote democracy’ (UNSC 
2000).  The OSCE also shifted its focus towards peacebuilding issues such as security 
sector reform and support for political parties.  However, the way that peace has been 
consolidated is  in  many ways  diametrically  opposed to  international  norms.   Whilst 
political  violence  has  significantly  diminished,  government  has  become  increasingly 
authoritarian. 
The period since 2000 has seen the increasing political dominance of Rahmonov’s 
Danghara clique. The 70:30 split of posts between government and opposition which had 
been part of the peace agreement was no longer maintained and only a few former-
opposition figures still remained in position.3 A June 2003 referendum served to change 
the constitution in fifty areas, for example allowing two seven-year presidential terms, 
raising the possibility of Rahmonov staying in office until 2020.  However, this shrinking of 
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the circle of power has primarily involved work behind the scenes, such as the use of 
‘administrative resources’, kompromat (‘compromising materials’) and state pressure to 
remove political opposition.  Targets have included both opposition figures from the war, 
most prominently Mahmudruzi Iskandarov, the leader of the Democratic Party, and some 
of President Rahmonov’s former allies, including Ghaffor Mirzoyev, the commander of the 
presidential guard.  Quantitative data provide further evidence of this trend towards 
increasing authoritarianism.  Freedom House’s index reports that Tajikistan remained 
firmly within its ‘not free’ category for both civil liberties and political rights across the 
period, 2001-2006 (7 = most unfree; 1 = most free).  As shown in fig. 1 below, despite 
marginal improvements as the peace treaty was implemented after 1997, there has been 
a gradual yet consistent decrease in freedom since 2001.  
Fig. 1: Nations in Transit Democracy Score, Freedom House, 1997- 2006
1997 1998 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Democracy score
[7 = least free; 1 = 
most free]
6.20 5.95 5.75 5.58 5.63 5.63 5.71 5.71 5.93
Post-Conflict Interpretations, Post-Conflict Spaces
Thus whilst Tajikistan is a country at peace, no one seems to be able to explain with any 
great conviction or credibility how it got there, and particularly how and why it remains 
there.  Practitioners and analysts of international peacebuilding have been sceptical 
about the durability of Tajikistan’s peace – often predicting a return to conflict in the 
future (See Schoeberlein 2002; Lynch 2001; Hall 2002; Collins 2003; ICG 2001).   Yet 
alternative propositions for peace have a distinctly neo-liberal orientation.  They posit 
what is denoted critically as a ‘liberal peace’ (Paris 2004; Richmond 2005) which, in 
Bertram’s terms, ‘entails building the political conditions for a sustainable democratic 
peace,  generally  in  countries  long  divided  by  social  strife,  rather  than  keeping  or 
enforcing peace between hostile states and armed parties’ (1995: 388).  
Under the influence of this discourse of peacebuilding, analysts have proposed 
various partial explanations for the Tajik puzzle.  ‘War weariness’ (Schoeberlein 2002), 
the effects of labour migration (Olimova and Bosc 2003) and cultural passivity (Olimova 
and Bowyer 2002) are all suggested as reasons why Tajikistan remains authoritarian yet 
without violence.  There may be some truth to each of these explanations, yet the 
success of Tajikistan in avoiding further war is more than a historical anomaly or a 
temporary reprieve, and the lack of progress in democratisation more than a matter of 
impatience  with  an  inevitably  long-term  process.   The  paradigms  used  by 
internationals, leaders and citizens in Tajikistan are all faulty as they each fail  to 
capture  the  social  character  of  Tajikistan’s  peace.   However,  popular  and  elite 
representations cannot merely be cast aside by the social scientist in favour of better 
explanations based perhaps on economic networks or informal political institutions. 
Rather, a better explanation should take account of the work that discourses do – their 
reductions,  oversights,  affirmations  and  negations  –  in  producing  and  reproducing 
social  realities  of  peace.   It  is  such  ‘peace’  which  internationals,  elites  and 
subordinates together make and remake.  
This  ‘peace’  is  interpreted  in  contrasting  ways  in  different  political 
communities.  One theorization of this complexity is through a discourse analysis and 
ethnography of ‘multiple selves.’  This concept is borrowed from Hansen who explores 
the relational character of identities and how they produce, and are reproduced by, 
foreign  policies  (2006).   She  distinguishes  between studies  of  single  and  multiple 
‘selves’,  where  a  ‘self’ is  a  spatially  determined group with  a  common sense  of 
identity (2006: 73).  While a study of foreign policy (like Hansen’s own work) can be a 
single ‘self’ study, a study of a peacebuilding process under international intervention 
(such as this) must explore the relations between multiple ‘selves’.  
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My research delineated three inter-connected but separable ‘public transcripts’ 
(Scott 1990) – discourses – of the Tajik peace.  They are:
(i) International peacebuilding
(ii) Elite mirostroitelstvo (Russian: peacebuilding)
(iii) Popular tinji (Tajik: peacefulness/wellness)
The demand of brevity affords me little space to elaborate on the nature of these 
three discourses which are detailed at length elsewhere (Heathershaw 2007a, 2007b). 
The table below provides a stylised summary of the three approaches.  Each discourse 
employs ethical, spatial and temporal dimensions (Hansen 2006).  The global discourse 
of peacebuilding found in the International Community is practised in the programmes 
and projects of international organizations, including the UN, OSCE and international 
NGOs.  Its overall approach postulates a liberal peace with an ethical individualism, a 
spatial  demarcation  of  state  and  civil  society  (or  top-down  and  bottom-up),  and 
temporal  ideal  of  progress.   Secondly,  Tajik  and  former  Soviet  elites  practice  an 
approach  to  conflict  resolution  often  labeled  mirostroitelstvo  (Russian: 
peacebuilding),  related  to  authoritarian  approaches  to  mirotvorchestvo  (Russian: 
peacekeeping)  discussed  elsewhere  (MacKinlay  and  Cross  2003).   It  is  a  peace 
enforcement approach which denies an autonomous space of civil society to influence 
government and idealises the ‘authority’ (avtoritet) of the state above the people, 
and a post-conflict ‘stability’ (stabilnost) where economic growth and social control 
are valued over liberalization and reform.  Finally, tinji (Tajik: peacefulness/wellness) 
is a practical ethos of post-conflict survival found in Tajik localities; an approach of 
conflict avoidance and accommodation.  Most Tajiks shun political involvement of any 
kind, and deny the existence of conflict or tension in their villages.  This ‘harmony 
ideology’ (Bichsel 2005) has a tremendous purchase, despite its deceptions, as a self-
regulatory institution of rural communities.
These local discourses of ‘peace enforcement’ and ‘conflict avoidance’ are not 
immutable but socially constructed and maintained.  Nevertheless they have evolved 
throughout  periods  of  international  intervention  and  have  conditioned  elite  and 
popular responses to these initiatives.  In some ways, as is explored below, they have 
been emboldened during international programmes.  Should we simply understand this 
as a failure of peacebuilding?  Or, should we try and understand these discourses in 
terms of their ‘positives’, i.e. their functions, and how they shape the contestation of 
post-conflict  space between internationals,  officials  and locals?   I  take the latter 
course.   In  such  a  way  we  can  chart  the  reproductions  and  adaptations  in 
representations across three discourses during post-conflict international intervention.
Fig. 2: Summary Table of Discourses of Peace in Tajikistan (from Heathershaw 
2007b)
Level Discourse Spaces ‘Public 
transcript’
Overall 
Approach
(Ideology)
GLOBAL Peacebuilding International. The 
programmes and 
projects of the 
International 
Community
- Individualist
- Liberal-
democratic
Democratisatio
n
(Neo-
Liberalism)
ELITE Mirostroitelstvo
(Russian: 
peacebuilding)
Elite. 
Official/state 
institutions, many 
large NGOs, 
academic & 
cultural elite
- Avtoritet 
(authority)
- Stabilnost 
(stability)
Peace 
Enforcement
(Neo-
Sovietism) 
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POPULAR Tinji 
(Tajik: 
peacefulness/ 
wellness)
Local. 
Particularly those 
areas most 
affected by the 
conflict
- Denial of 
conflict
- Unity/cohesion
- Anti-politics
- Focus on 
livelihoods
Conflict 
Avoidance and 
Accommodatio
n
Seeing like the International Community
To  speak  of  seeing  like  the  International  Community  and  to  delineate  a  single 
international discourse of peacebuilding in Tajikistan is potentially misleading.  This 
iconoclastic move, found in an emerging literature on the ‘liberal peace’ (Paris 2004; 
Richmond 2005), is regarded as a misrepresentation by many practitioners who regard 
themselves as pragmatists.  It is also increasingly out of touch with discursive trends, 
in  the  policy  and  academic  worlds,  where  peacebuilding  is  being  increasingly 
understood in the conservative terms of statebuilding where security is the principal 
goal.  At the same time, representatives of humanitarian agencies, for example, tend 
to emphasise so-called ‘bottom-up’ peacebuilding and the promotion of reconciliation 
and  community  dialogue  within  and  between  communities  (see  Anderson  1999, 
Lederach 1997). How is  one to make sense of this  in terms of discourse analysis? 
Whilst there is a great deal of commonality among the positions taken within a given 
‘self’, in each case we see a number of contending variations on the main theme.  We 
can also begin to reveal the ‘hidden’ transcripts which question these public accounts. 
In this  paper my concern is  principally with the ‘community peacebuilding’ 
concept  of  development  agencies.   The  policy  discourse  of  non-governmental 
peacebuilders is  inter-textually produced according to the demands of donors who 
increasingly seek to reconcile such ‘bottom-up’ work with wider statebuilding goals. 
However,  despite  this  cohabitation  with  interventions  for  order  and  security, 
community peacebuilding is  represented as radical  and transformative where ‘civil 
society’ (from  the  ‘bottom-up’)  can  engender  ‘good  governance’  (from the  ‘top-
down’).  The concept of the Community-Based Organisation (CBO) has emerged to 
reflect this idea of civil society development partly as an antidote to the centralising 
demands of the post-conflict state and the corruption of elites (Ball 2002: 37).   
The discursive construction of a ‘civil society’ role in peacebuilding is integral 
to  the  design  and  implementation  of  such  programmes  in  Tajikistan.   Promoting 
community-based development and decentralisation has been a priority goal of the 
International  Community  in  Tajikistan for  some time, particularly  during  the early 
years  of  this  decade  (DeMartino  2004).   Abdullaev  and  Freizer’s  ‘peace  building 
framework’ identified people’s opportunities to ‘participate in local decision making 
and  policy  formulation  through  reform  of  local  self  governance  bodies  and  the 
development of more efficient community development institutions’ (2003: 53).  By 
Spring 2004 the rapid expansion in the volume of peacebuilding programmes across the 
country  encouraged the UNDP to  bring  the various  agencies  together  in  the Tajik 
capital, Dushanbe, to share information about ‘community-linked development’ and 
coordinate activities to ‘promote decentralisation and provide a stronger framework 
for governance at the municipal level’ (UNDP 2004).  
Of all these players, USAID is the largest national donor agency in Tajikistan and 
has  been  the  most  significant  actor  in  community  peacebuilding.   Until  2006 
implemented a number of major community programmes through international NGO 
contractors.  Its Community Action Investment Program (CAIP) was the largest ever 
community-based programme in Tajikistan and is imbued with specific peacebuilding 
objectives.4  CAIP’s  stated goal  was to ‘help prevent conflicts and promote broad 
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based-citizen dialogue and participation’, to achieve ‘improved standards of living, 
more  active  and  engaged citizens  and  more open,  accountable  local  government’ 
(MCCAR 2005: 1).  The methodology of CAIP, as implemented by Mercy Corps, entailed 
‘the democratic election of Community Action Groups (CAG), transparent, sustainable, 
and  accountable  management  of  projects,  and  advocacy  for  support  from  local 
government and community residents’ (ibid.).5  
Assumptions about the disaggregation of space, implicit within peacebuilding 
discourse, are foundational to such programmes.  Thus it is assumed that CBOs can be 
established in an autonomous realm of civil society.  Some further contend that the 
local neighbourhood group (or  mahalla committee) already provides a participatory 
forum  for  community  decision-making  (Freizer  2004:  18)  which  simply  needs 
institutionalizing.  This rather apolitical view of the mahalla is problematic and raises 
a  much  greater  issue which  will  be explored  through the rest  of  this  paper.  The 
question is  how the boundary between ‘state’ and ‘society’ gets  lost  in  both the 
ambiguities  of  ‘community’  (as  invoked  by  international  peacebuilders)  and  the 
material necessities of scratching out a living (as practiced in Tajik villages).  On the 
one  hand,  this  intermingling  is  an  aspect  which  is  present  in  Tajik  communities, 
regardless of international intervention, due to the dual societal and state roles of 
local elites.  On the other hand, international NGOs deliberately blur the boundary in 
their discourses in order to express positive engagement between ‘state’ and ‘civil 
society’ – the dual subjects of peacebuilding.  Mercy Corps, for example, includes non-
military bodies of the state (presumably including the Presidential Administration) in 
its  definition of  civil  society.   A senior  staff  member of  Mercy Corps  in Tajikistan 
remarked, ‘you may ask “well, what isn’t civil society?” Well, I’d answer that the 
military isn’t civil society and, in some countries, they are a large part of the state.’6 
However, when the same individual represents both the ‘state’, as a member of the 
district  administration,  and ‘civil  society’,  as  a  member  of  the CAG, we have to 
question to what extent state and civil society are actually institutionally separable in 
the first place.
How Peacebuilding Fails
I  will  now  go  on  to  summarise  my  findings  regarding  the  impact  of  CBOs  on 
communities, particularly those of Mercy Corps’ CAIP.  I will briefly look at the three 
principal  phases  of  the programme: establishing and training  the CAG; community 
decision-making; and conducting social  and infrastructure projects.   I  contrast the 
claims of the official evaluation of the programme (of which I was part [MCCAR 2005]) 
with  local  elite  and  popular  practices  and  representations,  which  were  indirectly 
affected  by  international  intervention.   This  raises  an  interesting  question  of 
evaluation – how did we get it so wrong? – that I will go on to discuss.  
The spatial assumptions of community peacebuilding, outlined above, inscribe 
local context as a matter of secondary consideration.  As Giffen and Earle note, while 
rhetorical recognition of ‘local culture’ is standard, assumptions about post-war and 
traditional  society  mean  that  in  practice  a  methodological  assumption  of  carte 
blanche is dominant (2005: 37).  This type of approach is common among NGOs and 
sometimes even publicly acknowledged.  The Mountain Societies Development Support 
Program (MSDSP), which also administered the CAIP programme, prides itself on its 
ability to ‘indigenise’ their CBO and argues that ‘[our] analysis of the institutional 
framework at the village level showed that there was a “vacuum” ’ (Tetlay 2001: 3). 
MSDSP contends that pre-existing institutions could be disregarded given that they 
‘were  not  particularly  development  oriented  and  were  not  what  could  be  called 
“participatory”.’ (ibid.).   However, whether one assumes a governance ‘vacuum’ in 
the community, or whether one idealises pre-existing institutions, the problem remains 
that one cannot necessarily expect the peasants and elders, who are the very object 
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of interventions, to concur.  This is confirmed by the ‘hidden transcript’ of programme 
staff.  One CAIP manager reflected after the end of the programme,
Is it really sustainable to create new groups rather than work with existing 
structures, like these elders [aksakal or mahalla] committees?  The problem is 
that the relationship between the two was not planned for in the programme.7
Thus, in effect, international NGOs tried to introduce formal institutions into Tajik 
communities in which informal institutions of self-governance were already quite well 
established.  This meant that the processes of forming CBOs were distorted by those 
institutions and ideas to the extent that international assistance served to  re-form 
pre-existing institutions.   
The  table  below  summarises  and  contrasts  the  findings  of  the  official 
evaluation of the programme (of which I was one of three internationally-employed 
researchers [MCU 2005]) based on substantial survey data, with my own independent 
ethnographic research and discourse analysis (often conducted alongside the official 
study [Heathershaw 2007b]).  These contrasts indicate how discourse which takes for 
granted the autonomy of CBOs can lead to findings which are, at times, the very 
opposite of local elite and popular accounts.  In many villages, local leaders sought to 
combine different CBOs which had been initiated by different agencies (including the 
UN and numerous NGOs) into a single body which was then run by the same leadership 
group which had been dominant in the village prior to the intervention.  Such groups 
often equated success with closeness to the state and most groups included members 
who were state employees.  However, neither ‘state’ nor ‘civil society’ is the crucial 
category here.  Informal patterns of power predominate as the elite network which 
occupies the ‘state’ spreads its reach across the regions of the country.  Practices of 
communal labour (khashar), in this light, are top-down initiatives which perform the 
authority of leaders.
Fig. 3:  Official Evaluation versus My Findings
Official Evaluation (MCU 2005) My Findings (Heathershaw 2007b)
Institutional 
Basis 
The Community Action Group.
CAIP was ‘moderately successful 
in institutionalising the 
organisational arrangements’ of 
the CAG (MCU 2005: 15-16); 
success would be determined by 
formal plans for future 
development and registration as 
NGO.
Under CAIP, the CAG was the re-
formation of the local 
neighbourhood committees 
(mahalla) or groups of elders 
(aksakals); 
success understood locally as the 
pre-existing group of leaders 
serving as contact point for all 
international interventions 
(Heathershaw 2007b: .268-270).
Decision-
making 
procedures 
Community Meetings led by 
CAG.
CAIP was, ‘highly successful in 
engaging the local population in 
participatory and democratic 
change processes at the 
community level’ (p.26).
Informal patterns of power; 
villagers acquiesce to decision of 
head; decisions made, in advance, 
outside of meetings – at namaz or 
over tea in the choihona (pp.270-
272).
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Conducting 
projects
Communal labour (khashar)
khashar romanticised as a 
voluntary institution which can 
simply be ‘harnessed’ by NGOs.
khashar performs the authority 
of leaders who, resourced by the 
NGO, direct the people to work 
(pp. 272-276);
 
The imperative to homogenise the CAG under the existing leadership is clearly 
analogous  with  the  ethics  of  ‘authority’  and  ‘stability’  found  in  mirostroitelstvo 
discourse.  Moreover it corresponds to a mode of elite dominance over subordinates 
which  has  been  re-established  in  the  regions  of  Tajikistan  following  the  peace 
agreement.  This process has reconstituted hegemonic authority to a greater or lesser 
degree  across  the  country  and  has  been  inadvertently  advanced  by  international 
assistance.  The head of the community (raisi mahalla), as the key entry-point into the 
community, is  emboldened by access to foreign funding.  He receives requests for 
support directly from heads of households and then discusses it with the group.  ‘They 
respect us because we are respected,’ one group member noted, 
but they don’t listen often because they know we have no financial means to 
build a new sportsground or new classrooms. It depends on what we can 
provide.  If, for example, a donor buys pipes for a water system all the people 
will listen to us as they will see we’ve been able to do this.8
Such testimonies  support  my general  findings  that  elite  hegemony and patriarchal 
leadership was reinforced by international interventions.  
This  account  of  the  emboldening  of  local  patriarchal  authority  under 
international intervention is not merely anecdotal but was found consistently in the 
communities I studied.  It can be analysed in terms of the increasing complementarity 
of  tinji  and  mirostroitelstvo  discourse  (and  corresponding  practices)  within 
communities.  Fig.  4  compares  communities  at  the  beginning  of  another  Mercy 
Corps/USAID programme with a similar approach, the Peaceful Communities Initiative 
(PCI), with those at the end of CAIP.  It shows two main response categories to the 
open  question,  ‘How are  decisions  made  in  the  community?’   The  first  category, 
‘together’ includes those answers which emphasise the community as a whole, or the 
community with its leaders making decisions (in accordance with tinji discourse).  The 
second category of answer, ‘by leaders’, includes those answers which emphasise an 
independent decision being made by leaders (including ‘by the mahalla committee’, 
‘by the men’,  ‘by aksakals’,  ‘by local  authorities’,  or  some combination of  these 
groups in accordance with mirostroitelstvo).  Research conducted at the beginning of 
the  PCI  programme showed an  overwhelming  majority  of  villagers  (47  out  of  60) 
answering  ‘together’.   Research  conducted  at  the  end  of  the  CAIP  programme, 
however, showed many fewer respondents giving this response (31 out of 60) and many 
more  saying  they  were  taken  by  ‘leaders’  (25  out  of  60).   Such  analysis  is  not 
statistically significant but is indicative of findings from my wider discourse analysis 
and ethnographic research which show a significant shift towards the renewal of elite 
domination under international assistance (see Heathershaw 2007a). 
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Fig.4: ‘How are decisions taken in the community?’  A comparison between the beginning and end of international programmes9
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How Peacebuilding Survives
We  have  seen  how  international  representations  of  community  peacebuilding 
contradict  how  such  interventions  are  imagined  and  practised  by  elites  and 
subordinates.  These contrasts raise questions about how peacebuilding’s ambiguity 
is  sustained  and  whether  conflicting  accounts  can  be  reconciled  into  a  single 
narrative of local governance which is acceptable to international peacebuilders, 
elites  and  subordinates.   However,  this  ambiguity  –  this  multiplicity  of 
representations and of spaces –  might actually be functional in itself.  To speak 
counterfactually, community peacebuidling programmes such as CAIP would not get 
funded if they were believed to be part of the re-constitution of elite domination 
and  manipulated  by  elites  in  the  ways  argued  here.   For  the  International 
Community, such discourses are functional to their legitimacy and, by extension, 
their  very  presence  in  Tajikistan.   It  would  be  tempting  to  argue  that  cynical 
programme managers manipulate data to positively represent their work; that their 
real aim is stability and that the transformational goals of community peacebuilding 
constitute  mere  rhetorical  gloss.   There  is  some  truth  to  this  but,  at  closer 
examination,  it  is  an  overly  agential  explanation  and  lacks  evidence.   In  my 
explanation,  agency  remains,  but  in  a  much more interdependent  form.   Here, 
individuals  (be  they  programme  managers  or  peasants)  re-produce,  adapt  and 
mediate the established discourses of their community (be it local or international) 
and thus  reinscribe spatially-defined boundaries  between themselves  and others. 
This  inter-textual process of reproduction –  how peacebuilding survives –  is  most 
clearly shown in processes of monitoring and evaluation.
Monitoring  and  evaluation  (M&E)  is  an  integral  component  of  any  major, 
donor-funded programme.  International staff spend a considerable proportion of 
their time producing various images and texts to represent their programme in terms 
which will be appreciated by an audience in Washington, London or Berlin.  It is 
these practices which explain how an intervention, which has had very little direct 
impact  on  the  practices  of  communities,  can  plausibly  be  considered  to  have 
transformed a community and be worth millions of dollars of assistance.  As noted 
above,  the  official  CAIP  evaluation  acknowledged  that  the  impact  on  Tajik 
communities  was  less  than  anticipated.   However,  the  reasons  for  the  lack  of 
complete  success  in  this  area  were  deemed to  be  internal  programmatic  issues 
where Mercy Corps had not paid sufficient heed to institutionalising the CBO after it 
was up and running.  Thus, it argues a ‘much higher level of achievement’ could 
have been reached by ‘a clearer articulation of the process of capacity building’ 
(MCU 2005: 39). In such a way a considerable degree of success was rescued for the 
programme and, more importantly, for the idea of the CBO and the identity of the 
International  Community  as  a  whole.   In  this  specific  way  we  can  say  that 
peacebuilding –  the discourse –  ‘survived’.  Interventionism, we are told, largely 
works  and,  where it  fails  to achieve its  objectives, it  can be improved through 
factors  endogenous  to  the  programme  such  as  ‘articulation  of  the  process’  by 
international  actors.   The  evaluation  report  does  not  even  consider  factors 
exogenous to the programme including the political, economic and social dynamics 
of the local setting.  Community development, as discussed at the beginnning of this 
chapter, is thus written as something which can be made intelligible and managed by 
the International Community.10  In this sense, the report depoliticises and objectifies 
the highly political and relational  processes of the reestablishment of legitimate 
order taking place in Tajik communities.  In cases where international agencies are 
examining themselves – as was the case with CAIP11 – quantitative analysis is all the 
more subjective.  How is such knowledge produced?  I argue that two processes of 
power-knowledge  are  at  work here:  quantitative  and textual  representation and 
narrative and visual simulation.
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Quantification and Representation
The  reduction  and  distortion  of  local  practice,  which  is  prevalent  in  M&E,  is 
particularly acute in quantitative analyses.  In accordance with the principles of new 
public  management  thinking  common  to  the  International  Community,  CAIP was 
designed with  SMART objectives.12 SMART objectives  are  the foundational  act  of 
reducing  a  complex  social  and  political  environment  to  a  set  of  quantifiable 
indicators in order to achieve objectivity, transparency and accountability for the 
programme.  In the official evaluation the external consultants conducted a social 
survey according to a statistically valid sample of respondents as well as focus groups 
and elite interviews according to standard interview forms.  Many of the questions 
asked  required  closed  answers  which  could  be  transposed  numerically.   The 
evaluation was designed this way in order to make our data quantifiable according to 
the requirements of the donor, USAID, who kept an index to rank communities across 
the region according to their degree of success in terms of programme objectives. 
Quantification  can  thus  provide  standardisation  where  the  same  attributes  can 
apparently be measured anywhere in the world.  It demands a method and model 
which is apparently universalisable.  Within the International Community, an M&E 
consultancy business has mushroomed to meet this demand, where individuals who 
know a model are hired to evaluate a programme in a region which they have never 
visited before.  In our case the lead consultant had not previously visited Central 
Asia  and did  not  visit  Tajikistan –  where 60% of  the programme resources  were 
invested – at all during the evaluation. 
Fig. 5: Respondents completing ‘individual’ questionnaires, Jirgatol district, April 
2005
The problem with such a standard or ‘objective’ approach is that it requires 
numerous ‘subjective’ judgements by the researcher to deal  with the significant 
complexities of the social and political processes going on in Tajik localities.  The 
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practice of fieldwork demands such reflection and interpretation at every turn.  For 
example, the question ‘how have you changed during the programme?’ assumed that 
the respondent would interpret ‘you’ as ‘I’ the individual (rarely the case), that they 
would  accept  ‘change’  and  not  find  this  idea  unsettling  (often  not  the  case). 
Demanding a written answer to such a question also  assumed that  (often semi-
literate) respondents would be comfortable answering alone without consulting their 
colleagues.  Usually, this was not the case (see fig.5).  Throughout the evaluation, I 
found that questions often received defensive ‘we’ answers.  The categorisation of 
data was also shaped by how the reader viewed the data.  I observed in numerous 
meetings of the research team and programme staff how those who worked on the 
programme would understandably try and represent it in the best possible terms and 
broadly in accordance with programme objectives.  To a certain extent such inter-
subjective influences are common to all social research but it is a particular problem 
with  quantitative  methods,  especially  in  M&E  exercises,  where  assumptions  of 
objectivity are being made.
An illustration of the differences this inter-subjective, inter-personal process 
can make is shown in two attempts to classify data on community ‘change’ graphed 
in the following two figures.13  Version one (see fig. 6) of that chart shows a version 
done by my colleague, according to the instructions of the lead consultant.  It finds 
39% of respondents say ‘I’ am ‘committed to work with community using democratic 
principles’.   Version  two (see  fig.  7)  shows  my version,  composed –  in  a  more 
discretionary and less ‘scientific’ manner – having seen chart one and found it to be 
a  distortion  of  what  I  had  heard  from  community  members.   It  finds  42%  of 
respondents saying ‘we’ are ‘more united [in our] approach to development in the 
community.’  It is not clear how we judge which of these representations is more 
valid.   Both  charts  necessarily  reduce  a  huge  range  of  data,  gathered  in  and 
translated from four languages, to just five categories.  For example, my category of 
‘Increased Ability to Manage Projects’ (fig. 7) is around three times more common 
among  (overwhelmingly  male)  local  government  leaders  than  women’s  group 
members.   It  includes  both  statements  about  authority  (e.g.  ‘I  think  that  my 
authority has been increased among people’) and those implying acquired skills (e.g. 
‘project selection’).  
13
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Fig. 6: ‘How have you changed?’ Chart version one
Community Action Group members: How have you changed?
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Acquired Leadership/Organizational Skills
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Gained skills in problem-solving/confliction
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Commitment to work with community
using democratic principles
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Fig. 7: ‘How have you changed?’ Chart version two
Community Action Group members: How have you changed?
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A More United Approach to
Development in the Community
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While our research sought to account for these validity questions by conducting several 
exercises of classification and re-classification, the sheer complexity of this picture can 
never  be  conveyed  in  quantitative  representation  with  the  necessarily  reductive 
moves.14  Moreover, while the two charts give very different pictures, neither shed much 
light on what actually happened in communities and why.  In short, much is left to the 
eye of the beholder.  He/she may discern from figure 6 that 39% of community leaders 
in CAIP communities are indeed ‘democratic’.  It is via this kind of subjectivity that 
illusory international understandings are reproduced. 
Stories, Images and Simulation
Keeping the very idea of ‘community peacebuilding’ going involves more than numeric 
representation of  objectives  met.   In a multinational  and multilingual  International 
Community, any given textual or numeric form of representation is only one part of a 
wider symbolic order increasing reliant on the visual dimension.  Stories and images 
from CAIP communities were a hugely important part of Mercy Corps’ narration of the 
programme.   Pictures  and  images  are  particularly  important  in  the  International 
Community  as  they  break  representational  boundaries  of  language  and  allow  the 
visualisation  or  ‘re-envisioning’  (Debrix  1999)  of  success  and  progress  in  peace 
operations.  Photographs and ‘success stories’ are crucial accompaniments of quarterly 
reports  to  donors.  They are  particularly  important  as  the decision-makers  of  donor 
agencies are unlikely to spend much time reading formal M&E reports.  Success stories’ 
are  told  in  such  a  way  which  inscribes  a  clear  distinction  between  ‘state’  or 
‘government’ and ‘civil society’ or ‘community’. Under such discourse, the separation of 
the  civil  society  from  state  –  which  is  an  inherent  assumption  of  community 
peacebuilding – is inscribed even if, paradoxically, the ‘state’ must be subsumed into 
‘civil society’.  
During my fieldwork I had personal experience of this phenomenon.  In June of 
2005, I was asked by Mercy Corps to study one of the cases considered most successful 
from the thirty-five CAIP communities  in order to provide a ‘success  story’ for  the 
programme’s final report.  I chose the community of Kizil Ketmen, near Sharituz, close 
to the Afghan border, and opted to spend a week there conducting research and living 
with  the  head of  the  CAG.   Compared to  previous  CAIP communities  where  I  had 
conducted research, Kizil Ketmen was, indeed, a flagship case where a large number of 
projects had been completed over the course of the programme, including a major 
rehabilitation of irrigation canals.  Thus, I wrote and photographed a story of success, 
‘The  Village  of  Kizil  Ketmen:  on  an  Upward  Trend’  (Heathershaw  2005b).   In  the 
account, I tried to explore this story of success with quotes and examples which showed 
how local leaders had to work amid a corrupt government and an exploitative economy. 
Nevertheless, I wrote for an audience.  My account introduced Kizil Ketmen in terms 
such  as  ‘progress’,  ‘challenges’  and  ‘change’,  and  was  illustrated  with  pleasing 
photographs.  In my portrayal, as was the case in peacebuilding discourse in general, 
the CAG was presented as an institution independent of ‘the state’ that functioned as 
an agent of change.  The case study concluded:   
Like many other grassroots leaders and community members, they have been 
begun to see that change for the better can really impact their own lives and 
that of their fellow community members.  Hope, like water, is beginning to flow 
through Kizil Ketmen again (Heathershaw 2005b: 12).  
However, Kizil  Ketmen’s CAG included state representatives and it was clearly these 
elites as well as their contacts in local networks (without which projects could not have 
been conducted) which benefited most from these projects (Heathershaw 2007b).  The 
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point here is not that I deliberately misrepresented the village.  Rather, I did not tell 
the whole story.  Indeed it is not possible to tell the whole story.    
As an evaluator, I was in a certain sense ‘trapped’ by peacebuilding discourse. 
This  ‘entrapment’  took  place  due  to  the  broader  context  of  the  International 
Community: I understood that I was paid to produce a story which would show-case the 
successes of CAIP to an audience of paymasters; I was part of a team of dedicated 
international  and  local  staff  many of  whom believed in  the  programme (albeit  for 
different  reasons);  I  myself  had  developed  a  personal  perspective  that  CAIP  had 
achieved some good for poor communities (despite failing to achieve its peacebuilding 
objectives) and did not  want to denigrate its  achievements.   Thus,  M&E tells  us  a 
considerable amount about the social and political relationships between evaluator and 
evaluated.  In this sense, as a form of (mis)representation, it serves a very important 
function: it keeps international cash coming for ‘community development’ in the sincere 
hope that such programmes are benefiting communities and bringing about a more just 
world.   Whilst  the discursive  practices  of  M&E do not  necessarily  constitute  direct 
manipulation or fabrication of data, programme coordinators are often quite ambivalent 
in  private  about  the  conclusions  of  evaluations  and  the  nature  of  their  work.   In 
conversation  with  one  Mercy  Corps  programme  coordinator  I  remarked  that  such 
programmes might work better if they had more plausible aims.  He/she noted that ‘if 
you wrote a realistic proposal  the donors  are not  interested,  so you have to write 
something that interests them and then you end up with a programme which is really 
hard  to  implement.’15  Such  testimonies  exhibit  a  certain  amount  of  cynicism and 
scepticism in private, but not do not constitute the widespread public disclosure that 
would challenge the whole idea of ‘community peacebuilding’.  Moreover, they bear 
witness  to  the  power  of  discourse  to  shape  how  ‘community’  is  practiced  in 
peacebuilding.
Conclusions
Community  peacebuilding  in  Tajikistan  ‘failed’  in  the  sense  that  international 
programmes  did  not  achieve  their  stated  goals  in  practice.   It  ‘survived’  because 
simulacra of peacebuilding were retained in the evaluation of these programmes.  The 
argument made here evokes the provocative satire of conflict prevention in Central Asia 
by  Megoran  (2005),  whilst  echoing  the  argument  of  Debrix  (1999)  regarding  the 
simulation or ‘re-envisioning’ of international peacekeeping.  It raises the question: if 
the local  community is  simulated,  what  or  where is  being discursively  constructed? 
Debrix’s Re-Envisioning Peacekeeping followed a Foucauldian tack to demonstrate how 
peacekeeping’s  function  of  ‘riot  control’  is  re-presented  by  the  International 
Community.  The UN, he notes, ‘must represent world order in its absence’ (1999:16). 
Debrix  thus  regards  UN peacekeeping  practice  as  simulation where  the  world  body 
presents a façade, a form without substance, ‘that would have to be ideologically filled 
in order to obtain signification and a sense of purpose’ (1999: 6).  Peacekeeping and by 
extension  peacebuilding  are  not  hegemonic  in  that  their  goals  are  achieved  and 
represented as such.  Rather, they are hegemonic because their success is simulated.  In 
this sense Debrix argues,
Peacekeeping does not represent (disciplinary) liberal ideology.  Once again, it 
simulates  it.   Peacekeeping  depicts  a  fantasy  space  or  dream  land  of 
international affairs (where peacekeeping operations are successful, governance 
is realised, etc.) inside which claims to neoliberalism on a global scale can be 
made (Debrix 1999: 216). 
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Peace operations, although ‘failing’ in a given practical case, produce simulacra of their 
ideal world.  In such a way imaginations are captured and ‘failed’ strategies continued.  
It is my argument that community peacebuilding in Tajikistan is a specific case 
where  international  intervention  has  supported  practices  of  domination  in  local 
governance whilst simulating democratisation via international peacebuilding discourse. 
Furthermore, I propose that this process is, in one form or another, commonplace in 
post-conflict  peacebuilding.   This  claim can  be  refined  and  tested  through  further 
research.  For now, it holds two potential yet fundamental theoretical implications for 
the study of  intervention in post-conflict  spaces.   The making of  such fundamental 
points can only be considered a meaningful contribution given the theoretical under-
development of the field.  Firstly, studies of post-conflict space should investigate the 
mutability  of  the  hegemonic  liberal  peace  and  the  resilience  of  local  spaces.   In 
Tajikistan,  it  is  the  local  context  which  is  imposed upon  peacebuilding  (in  the  re-
appropriations  of  international  programmes  to  embolden  local  elites)  as  well  as 
peacebuilding which is imposed upon the local context (as locals are relieved of control 
of how their communities are represented internationally).  Thus, the liberal peace 
perhaps  isn’t  as  homogenous  or  hegemonic  as  is  often  suggested;  as  a  form  of 
‘governmentality’ its reach into local post-conflict spaces is extremely limited.  This 
calls  into  question  the  assumptions  behind  leading  policy  reports  advocating  the 
extension of peacebuilding to statebuilding (UN 2004).  Paris, in an influential academic 
study, calls for an adjustment of peacebuilding practice in terms of ‘institutionalisation 
before liberalisation’ (IBL), thus ‘avoiding the pathologies of liberalisation, while placing 
war-shattered states on a long-term path to democracy and market-oriented economics’ 
(Paris 2004: 235).  However, this approach reproduces a subject-object conception of 
peacebuilding where localities are analytically significant only in terms of the extent to 
which they follow an externally-imposed model of instiutionalisation.  In making this 
argument, Paris thus repeats the very same fundamental ontological error which led to 
the failed imposition of liberalisation in the 1990s.  As Scott has shown, external actors, 
however powerful,  are in no position to impose models  which run counter to local 
informal processes.  They are but one community of players whose ideals and materials 
are adapted and re-appropriated by local elites who offer gateways to interventions and 
by local people who might resist them as alien or implausible.  The hegemony of the 
‘liberal  peace’  is  only  meaningful  in  the  globalised  post-conflict  spaces  of  the 
International  Community,  and  in  the  imaginaries  of  donors,  policy-makers  and  the 
citizenries of Western states.  
Secondly,  my analysis  suggests  that  peace is  produced inter-subjectively  and 
inter-spatially.  Whilst this paper is not the place to provide a thorough answer to the 
second question I posed in the introduction (How does peace hold?), the answer to the 
first question does hold some implications for the second.  Grand narratives such as 
peacebuilding  remain  ‘thin  simplifications’  of  the  practice  of  international 
peacebuilding.  ‘Exceptions’ to peacebuilding themselves are subject to symbolic orders 
and  forms  of  representation  found  in  the  worlds  of  local  elites  and  subordinates. 
‘Neoliberalism, as an ethos of self-governing,’ Ong notes, ‘encounters and articulates 
other ethical  regimes in particular  contexts’ (2006: 9).   This  is  the inter-subjective 
nature of peace which, rather than adhering to any objective condition or subjective 
interpretation, consists of the complex constitution of legitimate social and political 
relations.  The answer to the question of how peace holds cannot meaningfully be found 
in  a  particular  model  but  in  the  multiple  discourses  and  practices  of  post-conflict 
spaces.  Thus, this paper proposes that we must move beyond the idea of a single peace 
and towards  theoretical  and methodological  approaches  that  allow us  to  grasp  the 
diversity of experiences of multiple communities in post-conflict spaces.   International 
interventions  may  not  build  peace  directly  and  effectively  but  they  do  contribute 
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indirectly and affectively.  Scholars of peace operations must interrogate the ethical and 
political  conflicts  of  international  assistance.   Otherwise  they may become part  of 
peacebuilding’s failure.
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